Insider traders made some easy money on stock offerings

Insider trading is illegal not because it is unfair but because it is theft.

One thing that I like to say about insider trading is that people think it is illegal because it is unfair, but it is actually illegal because it is theft. Unfairness is just a fact of life, and of markets: People who are better at research will do better research, smarter people will have smarter insights, people with faster computers will trade faster, etc. Random individual hobbyist investors are not entitled to trade on a level playing field with people who invest billions of dollars for a living. Much regulatory lip service is paid to the idea that they are, for reasons that elude me, but it is obviously untrue.

The reason that insider trading is illegal is that nonpublic financial information belongs to someone, and if you use information that belongs to someone else without their permission, then you are stealing it. A company’s information — about earnings, or a merger, or whatever — belongs to the company as a whole, and it is generally illegal for the company’s executives or agents to trade on that information if it has not been made public. This distinction is at the root of many insider-trading facts that people find confusing. For instance there is the “personal benefit” test that has confounded prosecutors and politicians since the Newman decision: It is illegal for insiders to sell information from their companies (because that looks like theft), but it is not clearly illegal for insiders to give away that information (because that doesn’t). Or there is the fact that activist hedge funds can legally tip other hedge funds about their next target: The other funds can trade on that information because the owner of the information gave it to them as a present, so no theft was involved.

Insider Trading

Here’s a good insider-trading case from the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC charged “a former day trader living in California, Steven Fishoff,” and a few of his buddies with insider trading ahead of public companies’ stock offerings. These companies — there were 13 of them, all pretty small — raised money through what the SEC calls “confidentially marketed public offerings.” A company would engage an investment bank, which would call up potential investors and ask if they wanted to buy shares in the company. The bank would do this before the company publicly announced the offering, and would “wall-cross” the potential investors, making them agree to keep the information about the offering secret until it was announced publicly.

The theory here is that by wall-crossing some investors before the public announcement of the deal, you can test demand in relative safety. If you wall-cross 20 investors and get a lot of big orders, then you launch the deal publicly and build on strong demand to try to bring in more investors. If you wall-cross 20 investors and none of them are interested, you probably abandon the deal, with less embarrassment (and less impact on your stock price) than if you’d launched publicly and failed to get any buyers. There is also, perhaps, some psychological benefit to making investors feel that they’re in a special club that got an early look at the deal, a benefit that might encourage the wall-crossed investors to come into deals that they might otherwise have passed on. And by keeping the public marketing period of the deal short — you do the wall-cross, build an order book, and then announce the deal and price it within a day or two of announcing — you can reduce its impact on your stock price: If you’re not publicly marketing the deal for a week, traders have less time to pound down the stock price.

But after you do the wall-cross, you publicly announce the offering, and then the stock price pretty much automatically goes down. This is especially true for small companies, and is just a matter of supply and demand: The company is diluting its current shareholders and is raising money from new investors who will demand a discount to the previous market price to commit more money to the company. The companies in this case were generally down by double-digit percentages after they announced their offerings.

So here’s a predictable stock-market pattern and an easy way to exploit it: If a company calls you up to ask you to invest in its upcoming public offering, you should (1) say yes, (2) sell the company’s stock short before the public announcement, and then (3) buy the stock back in the public offering, generally at a 10+ percent discount, a few days later.

This is of course not legal advice! It is a great trade, but it is also double super illegal, insofar as:

  1. There is a specific SEC rule against short selling stock just before a public offering and then buying back the stock in the offering, and
  2. There is a general, and much more important, rule against trading on purloined material nonpublic information, and this is that. 

The reason it’s purloined information is that you agreed to take the wall-cross: In getting the information about the deal from the investment bank, you have to agree “to keep confidential, and not disclose to others, the offering information provided by the investment banking firm and refrain from trading the issuer’s securities or using the information for any reason other than determining whether to purchase securities in the offering.” And by trading in breach of that agreement, you are clearly violating not just the contract, but also insider trading laws, which make it illegal to trade “in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession of material, nonpublic information about the security.”

But, you know, who will check? The SEC claims that Fishoff and his associates made at least minimal efforts to cover their tracks, by using multiple investment funds (with names like Featherwood Capital, Gold Coast Total Return, Brielle Properties, Seaside Capital, etc.). Some of the funds would get wall-crossed, and then they’d tip each other and trade in the other funds to try to obscure what was going on:

Fishoff and, under his direction, Chernin and Costantin cultivated contacts at investment banks with the goal of ensuring that they would be on the list of prospective investors contacted to participate in securities offerings of the type described above. Fishoff, Chernin and Costantin used these contacts to seek out confidential information about, and get brought over the wall on, upcoming follow-on and secondary offerings. When they were successful in obtaining such information, Fishoff shorted the issuer’s stock in advance of the offerings, directed trading by Chernin and Costantin in those instances when he did not place the trades on his own, and tipped Petrello, who then also shorted the stock through Brielle and Oceanview.

In many instances, the Fishoff-controlled entities for which Chernin and Costantin were fronting also participated in the offering, with the stock going to Featherwood’s account and often being used to cover the short sales. 

But it was all, allegedly, one operation:

Since at least late 2010, Chernin and Costantin had their business emails automatically forwarded to Fishoff’s personal email account. As a result, emails that investment bankers sent to Chernin and Costantin confirming that they had been brought over the wall on an offering subject to a confidentiality agreement went instantly to Fishoff during this period. In addition to confirming the confidentiality terms and the prohibition on trading before the offering was announced, these emails typically identified the issuer, the type of offering and its anticipated timing.

I feel like that probably violates the wall-cross agreement? Though I have to say that the investment banks’ relationship with their customers does not seem to have been impressively deep:

To obtain access to confidential information about upcoming offerings, Chernin and Costantin, and in some instances Fishoff himself, deceptively established relationships with investment banks by separately cold-calling banks and posing as portfolio managers of legitimate investment funds. For example, Chernin and Costantin separately emailed multiple banks after making scripted cold calls to the banks, including to Investment Bank A, a leader in this segment of the market by deal count, and to Investment Bank B.

Chernin and Costantin both made the same pitch to the banks, falsely presenting themselves as portfolio managers at “firms” with as much as $150 million in assets “under management.”


To further the deception, many of the Featherwood DBAs and other entities controlled by Fishoff, including Featherwood, Gold Coast, Seaside and Cedar Lane, maintained identical, though purportedly unrelated, websites falsely proclaiming, among other things, that they were full service financial management firms involved in “Wealth Management, Private Equity Services, Investment Banking, [and] Real Estate Investments.”

Maybe if your customers have identical websites there’s something up with them?

Anyway these guys allegedly made $3.2 million on the fourteen deals, and are now in trouble. As well they should be! (If the allegations are true, etc.) Insider trading often looks like a victimless crime, but here there were clear victims — victims of theft, not of unfairness. The companies here were trying to sell stock. They knew that they’d more or less have to price the stock at a 10 or 20 percent discount to the market price, but they wanted to limit the damage that their offerings would do to the market price. One way to do that was by wall-crossing investors and limiting trading in front of the deal. By cheating on their wall-cross agreements and shorting the stock, these guys had the effect of driving down the stock price, which probably reduced the price in the offering. These companies probably got less money for their stock because their nonpublic information was (allegedly) used against them.

Though you could have a more cynical view of this sort of thing. A company needs to sell stock, but worries that announcing a public offering will drive down its stock price and not produce any takers. So it calls some investors up privately and tells them it’s doing a deal. Those investors agree to invest in the deal, but before the deal is announced they lay off their risk by shorting the company’s stock. Then the deal is announced and the investors buy shares from the company to (illegally) cover their shorts. The investors get their 10 percent, or whatever, discount to the market price as a commission; their real function is not to invest in the deal but to intermediate between the company (which can’t sell stock without a publicly disclosed offering) and the unsuspecting public (which buys from the “investors” before the public disclosure). The wall-cross agreement creates deniability for the company. No one’s stealing from the company; they’re helping the company get a deal done that would otherwise be much harder to achieve. The victims are the public who buy from the insider traders at the inflated, pre-announcement price.

That doesn’t seem to have happened here: These guys didn’t end up actually buying much stock in many of these deals, so the issuers couldn’t really have been using them to illegally distribute stock. But it is a classic feature of penny-stock financing that we’ve discussed before, and if I were defending Fishoff and friends it’s an angle that I might explore. These guys didn’t steal from the companies whose stock they insider traded: They helped those companies raise money that they otherwise would have had a harder time raising. Sure, they did so in a way that was really unfair to public investors. But remember: Fairness isn’t the goal of insider trading law.

©2015 Bloomberg View



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